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1 Introduction
Social capital is a key concept in social sciences. It is considered to be the missing link that
can explain why differences in economic performance persist over the centuries (Guiso et al.
2011), and a fundamental ingredient for democracy maintenance and institutional performance
(Putnam 1993). In this paper, we aim to understand the historical origins of social capital,
document its persistence over time and its effects on economic development. We do this by
focusing on the legacy of the commons.
Common goods are resources (forests, pasture, irrigation systems, etc.) that are used and
managed collectively according to certain rules. The Spanish region of Catalonia provides an
excellent setting for analyzing the commons, for three different reasons. First, their historical
origins can be traced back to the resettlement patterns during the Christian conquest of the
Iberian Peninsula (eighth to eleventh centuries), by which each newly founded township was
granted a set of common lands. These common goods represented a collective-action problem
and its solution required a considerable amount of cooperation and mutual trust (Beltrán-Tapia
2012, Ostrom 1990). Our hypothesis is that this experience of cooperation, repeated over cen-
turies, increased the stock of social capital in each township.
Second, common goods persisted for a long time in Catalonia, broadly until the second
half of the nineteenth century. At that point in time they disappeared in many townships,
especially as a result of the Disentailment Act passed in 1855. This implies that if we find per-
sistence in current measures of social capital, even after the commons have long disappeared,
it must be either due to cultural transmission or to an institutional channel different from the
one that originated social capital in the first place. Third, for the purpose of identification,
we use exogenous variation that a law passed in 1845 generated in the amount of common
goods (i.e., cooperative networks) that formed each modern municipality. This law forced
small townships (≤ 30 householders, approximately 150 inhabitants) to merge with others.
Our research strategy exploits the jump in the probability of merging with another township—
based only on their population in 1845—in a Regression Discontinuity (RD) setting, as well as
in an Instrumental-Variable (IV) approach.
Our measure of current social capital is the number of voluntary associations per capita
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at the municipal level. To analyze the persistence of social capital, we regress our current
measure of social capital on our measure of social capital in the past, controlling for a number
of demographic, geographic, and climatic characteristics at the municipal level, as well as for
unobserved time-invariant differences at the regional level (including district fixed effects).
Results show that municipalities formed by a greater number of small townships in the past
currently have a denser network of voluntary associations.
An analysis by sub-periods shows that the persistence of social capital is mainly driven
by associations which proliferated once the democratic regime was consolidated in Spain. In-
terestingly, we observe that during Franco’s dictatorship period (1939-1975), the relationship
between commons and associations is negative. Associations during the autocratic period were
restricted in number and their goals had to be in line with the regime’s principles, so we cannot
consider them as a good proxy of social capital.
To address the potential endogeneity of our measure of social capital in the past (e.g., town-
ships with more cohesive individuals might have voluntarily merged together and have more
social capital today) we apply two empirical strategies. First, we implement an IV estimation
in which we use as an instrument for social capital in the past the number of townships in the
current municipality that merged because of the 1845 Act (i.e., because they had 30 household-
ers or fewer). Second, we apply an RD design in which we compare the outcomes of modern
municipalities where the main village’s population fell just below or just above the population
threshold established by the 1845 Act (again, having more than 30 householders). Results from
both identification strategies point in the same direction: municipalities with a greater number
of commons in the past currently have more voluntary associations per capita.
We analyze different types of associations based on their main activities (e.g., cultural, civic
rights, scientific knowledge, health and social welfare, etc.) and find that the persistence of
social capital is mainly driven by the ones that promote civic rights in a particular place—
typically, neighborhood associations. Many of these emerged within the boundaries of the old
townships rather than in the main town of the modern municipality (see Figure 2). We interpret
this as being consistent with our argument that local differences in social capital today stem
from the legacy of the commons and the collective-action institutions that arose around them.
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We also investigate the impact of social capital on today’s economic development. Our
measure of economic development is the average income tax base at the municipal level. Using
as an instrument of current social capital the presence of commons in the past, we find that an
increase in the modern-day density of associations is related to higher economic development.
This impact persists even after controlling for other drivers of economic development, such as
human capital, innovation, roads and public infrastructure, financial capital, and police forces.
Then we turn our attention to alternative modern measures of social capital—perceptions
of good citizenship, social interaction, and resident engagement—and results point again to
a positive relationship between the experiences of cooperation around the commons in the
past and today’s pro-social behavior. Finally, we look at a transparency index as a measure of
quality of governance at the municipal level and we do not find any significant relationship
with social capital in the past. Since we do not find any institutional differences, this last
finding means to suggest that the cultural channel is the most likely transmission mechanism
that explains the long-term persistence of social capital in our setting.
The literature on social capital is long-standing and extensive. Even though we share
the same research questions as other studies—namely, where is social capital coming from,
whether it persists over time, and its potential effects on economic development—we believe
that our paper makes a significant contribution to this literature. First, while most studies have
focused on one or two of these questions, we provide a more comprehensive analysis by bring-
ing together the analysis of the origins, long-term persistence as well as the effects of social
capital on development in a single study. Second and related to this, we are able to estimate
the effects of social capital more accurately by providing a separate theory of its determinants
based on the legacy of the commons (which, as Durlauf (2002) points, mitigates concerns about
the validity of our instruments), and by relying on a natural experiment that provides a clean
identification.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 pro-
vides the historical background of the commons in Catalonia, the reforms that modified them,
and the municipal map of Catalonia. We establish the conceptual framework in Section 4.
Section 5 details the data and explains our empirical strategy. The different set of results are
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discussed in Section 6. Section 7 presents additional results, looking at alternative measures
of social capital and at the relationship between social capital in the past and quality of local
governance. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to previous work on the origins and long-term persistence of social
capital. Guiso et al. (2016) study the case of Italian communes (self-governed cities in the Middle
Ages) and find that these cities have higher levels of social capital today. Their hypothesis
is that these experiences of independence fostered self-efficacy beliefs—beliefs in one’s own
ability to complete tasks and reach goals—and that this cultural trait was transmitted across
generations and explains current social capital.
Buggle and Durante (2017) analyze the effect of environmental factors on cooperation and
trust. They find higher levels of trust in those European regions with higher climate variabil-
ity. Their hypothesis is that pre-industrial farmers needed to cooperate in order to cope with
climate risk and that these experiences of cooperation fostered norms of generalized trust that
were transmitted over time even after climate was no longer so directly relevant to their eco-
nomic activity.
This paper focuses instead on an institution for collective action, the commons, that origi-
nated far back in history, managed to survive for a long time in rural and small towns, and was
widespread around the world, especially in pre-industrial Europe. We are not the first to look at
the commons; Beltrán-Tapia has extensively studied the role of the commons in the emergence
of agricultural cooperatives (Beltrán-Tapia 2012), in improving human capital (Beltrán-Tapia
2013) and life expectancy and body height (Beltrán-Tapia 2015a), in fostering agricultural pro-
ductivity (Beltrán-Tapia 2015b) and economic development (Beltrán-Tapia 2016) in Spain, and
the geographical persistence of the commons itself (Beltrán-Tapia 2015c). Apart from the fact
that we analyze a different outcome variable, namely current social capital, our work differs in
two key methodological dimensions. First, while Beltrán-Tapia’s work uses measures of com-
mon lands at the province level, we propose a novel measure of the commons at the municipal
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level, assuming that each township in the old regime managed a set of common goods. Sec-
ond, we exploit a historical event—a law enacted in 1845 that modified the municipal map of
Catalonia—as a natural experiment to draw causal inference.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature that has examined the effects of social capital
on economic development. Knack and Keefer (1997) show that both trust and civic norms
have a positive association with economic performance, although they find that associational
activity is unrelated to economic performance. Tabellini (2010) finds that European regions
with higher endowments of civic capital have higher GDP per capita today and higher growth
rates, and instruments current endowment of social capital with historical variables such as
literacy rates at the end of the nineteenth century and indicators of political institutions in the
1600-1850 period. In line with this latter paper, we also use a distant historical episode as
an instrument for social capital accumulation. On the other hand, we incorporate a separate
theory of the determinants of social capital, which mitigates concerns about the validity of our
instruments (Durlauf 2002).
The importance of social capital for the functioning of democratic institutions has also been
documented. Padró i Miquel et al. (2015) take the presence of temples in Chinese villages as
a proxy of social capital and show that after the introduction of elections, those villages with
higher social capital experienced larger increases in public goods provision. Even though social
capital is typically associated with positive outcomes, there are papers that show a negative
influence in specific cases. This is the case of Satyanath et al. (2017), who document that a
dense network of voluntary associations facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party by bringing more
people into contact with the party message and helping to destroy the democratic system.
More generally, our results also add to the growing literature on the persistence of cultural
values over long periods of time (Nunn 2012).
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on municipal mergers or amalgamations.
The bulk of this literature has examined the extent to which municipal amalgamations can
harvest economies of scale in the provision of public services, and found mixed or null results
(Reingewertz 2012; Blesse and Baskaran 2016; Blom-Hansen, Houlberg, Serritzlew et al. 2016).
We extend the focus by looking at the impact of municipal mergers on the accumulation of
6
social capital and, in turn, on the economic development of the municipal entity.
3 Historical Background
3.1 The Commons in Catalonia
The historical origins of the commons in Catalonia can be traced back to the resettlement pat-
terns at the beginning of the Christian conquest (or “Reconquista”) of the Iberian Peninsula
(eighth to eleventh centuries). During the early stages of the Reconquista, in order to guaran-
tee that the population would remain and defend the conquered territory, Christian kings and
nobles granted freedom and extensive privileges to townships under their control. These priv-
ileges included the granting of a plot of land to each family for its subsistence as well as the
right to self-government to manage common lands that were bestowed upon the township as
a whole (Brenan 1990).
Typically, the land surrounding the dwellings would be individually owned by the villagers
and devoted to intensive agriculture, and the land around this central core would qualify as
common land. Therefore, the borders of the common lands generally coincided with the bor-
ders of the townships founded during this period (Viñas et al. 2016). In territories where the
township was located near the sea and where land was not the main production factor, the
commons originated around other resources, such as fishing grounds and salt flats.1 Catalo-
nia’s medieval-law code (Usatges) already established the common use of these goods.2
1Brenan (1990) compiles different descriptions of these commons in several Spanish villages, many of them
located in Catalonia.
2The original legal text, largely coded in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, established that “Stradas e vias
publicas e ayguas corrents, e fons vivas, prats e pasturas, selvas, garrigas e rocas qui son fundadas en aquest terra
son de las potestats, no que ho hajen per alou ne ho tengan en domini, mas que tots temps sien a empriu de lurs
pobles, sens tot contrast e sens servici sabut.” Kagay (1994) translated it into English as follows: “Highways and
public roads, flowing water and fresh water springs, meadows and pastures, forests, coppices, and crags existing
in this land are the rulers’, not so they may have them as a freehold or hold them in lordship but so for all the time
these shall be for the use of all their people without any hindrance or encroachment and the establishment of any
tribute.”
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There were two different types of access to common goods. The first was simultaneous and
collective use by all town citizens. The second was the division of the land into lots allocated to
individual families of the community for a specified period of time, normally in exchange for a
monetary rent. The managing of these common goods represented a collective-action problem;
consequently, self-governing institutions such as local assemblies emerged to establish a fair
and rational system of use. In Catalonia, these local medieval institutions, known as consells,
initially included all the town residents. In the late Middle Ages the decisions were delegated
to a restricted group elected by the local assembly, except for small towns which continued to
be ruled by the full assembly of residents (Font i Rius 1985).
Common goods and self-governing institutions associated with them generally persisted in
Catalonia from early medieval times until the second half of the nineteenth century. Among the
factors that contributed to their disappearance we find the full industrialization of the region,
the centralization of policies and the greater degree of intervention by the central government.
Still, the fundamental drivers of the dismantling of the commons by modernizing governments
were the General Disentailment Act (Ley General de Desamortización) promoted by Finance Min-
ister Pascual Madoz in 1855 and the Uplands Act (Ley de Montes) of 1863 (Busqueta and Vicedo
1996). These laws allowed the central government to expropriate the common lands and sell
them at public auctions.
There was, however, an exemption to this general rule: municipalities were allowed to
keep their common lands if they could prove that they were being actively used by the local
villagers. If we accept that common lands were more actively used in townships in which the
network was more robust and vibrant (i.e., where social capital was higher), then we could use
data on these exemptions from disentailment to support our hypothesis—namely, that social
capital was higher in municipalities formed by a larger number of townships. We have col-
lected data from a public inventory of the exemptions published in 1901.3 These results are
shown in Table 11 in the appendix. We find a positive correlation between the number of old
townships that formed a modern municipality and the existence of common lands exempted
3This catalog completed and updated the previous one published in 1862, and was the result of the Royal
Decree of February 27th, 1897. The original title in Spanish is “Catálogo de los Montes Públicos y demás terrenos
forestales exceptuados de la desamortización por razones de utilidad pública”.
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from public auction. The results are consistent to alternative definitions of the dependent vari-
able. Column (1) and (2) show the marginal effects from a probit model in which the dependent
variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if there was any exemption in the municipal-
ity (12% of the modern municipalities obtained an exemption). Columns (3) and (4) show the
results of a Poisson model in which the dependent variable is defined as the share of municipal
land which was exempted from disentailment.
3.2 The 1845 Act and the Mergers of Townships
In 1845, in the midst of a liberal reform, a law forced small townships to merge with others.4
This Town Councils Act (1845) established in article 70 that “town councils with populations
of more than 30 householders shall be preserved [...]. Town councils with a smaller popu-
lation shall merge with another or else gather together and form a new town council”.5 A
householder (vecino in the law) is defined as the head of a household, and demographers and
historians assume that 1 householder equals 5 inhabitants.
Figure 1 shows changes in the municipal map of Catalonia in the period 1800-2015. The
current 948 Catalan municipalities are the result of more than 200 years of mergers and divi-
sions. Our calculations, based on work done by geographers (Burgueño and Lasso de la Vega
2002), show that in year 1800 there were 2,131 municipal entities (townships) in Catalonia. In
the last 200 years 1,192 townships (56% of the total) were merged; 488 current municipalities
are the same as in 1800 (23%); and 392 townships have become the core village or town of
a modern (merged) municipality (18%). The remaining 59 current municipalities (3%) were
newly established as a result of some division process occurred during this period.
From the total 1,192 mergers, 691 (58%) occurred during the period 1845-1854 as a result of
the 1845 Act. We have digitally compiled the maps that show changes in municipal boundaries
4Law about the Organization and Conferring of Town Councils (Ley de Organización y Atribuciones de los Ayun-
tamientos), sanctioned by Queen Isabella II on January 8th, 1845.
5Translation by the authors. Original text: “Se conservarán todos los ayuntamientos que hoy existen en pobla-
ciones de más de 30 vecinos, arreglando su organización á las disposiciones de esta ley. Los de menor vecindario
se agregarán á otros, o formarán, reuniéndose entre sí, nuevos ayuntamientos.”
9
and added some geographic information. By doing this, we find that 85.3% of the mergers can
be explained by exogenous characteristics of the townships involved.6
In general, the merging process did not erase small local communities; rather, they inte-
grated as a distinct community within the new municipality and have remained as such. To
show this, we have computed the percentage of built-up land that corresponds to the merged
townships. By combining cartographic information for 2009 on different types of land cover
(forests, crops, urban areas, etc.) with our map of historical townships, we have found that, on
average, 36.8% of the built-up land in the modern municipality corresponds to the old merged
townships.
We also compute a municipality fractionalization index, that is, the probability that two
individuals living in the same municipality live in different settlement areas (villages or mod-
ern developments). Using data from the 2011 census, we find that those municipalities that
experienced mergers in the past have a higher fractionalization index (45.6%) than those mu-
nicipalities that did not (28.7%). In addition, the percentage of people living in settlement areas
with less than 300 inhabitants is much higher in municipalities formed by merged townships
(46.5%) than in those municipalities that remained intact (35.1%). Furthermore, we find that
21% of the voluntary associations in our dataset are located in the old townships, rather than
in the main town or village of the modern municipality.
4 Conceptual Framework
Common goods are resources that are used collectively. We follow a broad definition of com-
mon goods that includes land (woodland, grassland or arable land), as well as other types of
resources, such as irrigation systems, fisheries or mills. The management of the commons cor-
6More precisely, 56.6% of the mergers took place between the old township and the closest current capital of the
municipality; 14.2% occurred between townships that were close to each other and one of them had as the nearest
neighbor the capital of the current municipality; finally, 3.6% of mergers were with the closest township within the
same judiciary district. The remaining 10.9% of mergers which did not comply with the shortest distance criteria
could instead be explained by being in the area of influence of an important municipality (5.1% of mergers) or for
geographical reasons (5.8%).
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responds to the local community. Institutions for collective action arose in order to profit from
the advantages that cooperation could offer (such as economies of scale and risk sharing) and
given the long-lasting nature of these communal arrangements (De Moor 2008). These institu-
tions regulated the use of the resources to avoid depletion and were mostly self-governed and
self-enforced, in the sense that their members were responsible for punishing deviant behav-
iors and solving any potential conflict.
As Ostrom (1990) shows, the successful solution to these coordination problems requires
a considerable amount of mutual trust and cooperation among individuals. Our hypothesis,
supported by Beltrán-Tapia (2012) and Font i Rius (1985), is that this practice, repeated over
centuries, increased the stock of social capital in each local community. When these small local
communities or townships merged together, the resulting municipalities accumulated a num-
ber of different cooperative experiences and social networks. Compared to a municipality in
which nothing happened, a newly formed municipality contained multiple robust yet distinct
and non-overlapping social networks. The key empirical question is thus whether social capi-
tal at the municipal level would be strengthened or undermined by the presence of segregated
cooperative networks in merged municipalities. On a theoretical level, Boix and Posner (1996)
argue that the former will be most likely true for high levels of social capital. Under this sce-
nario, individuals from strong and consolidated networks would be more keen to establish
connections with different networks; if their attempts fail, they will easily find backup in their
original network.
Shortly after small townships were forced to merge—around mid-nineteenth century—,
commons and collective-action institutions ceased to exist in most of the municipalities. We
therefore hypothesize that if we find any persistence in social capital, even after the commons
have long disappeared, it is due to its inter-generational transmission. As Guiso et al. (2011)
argue, social capital is highly persistent since its transmission channels—intra-family transmis-
sion, formal education and socialization—take a long time.
Following Putnam et al. (1993) and Guiso et al. (2016), among others, our measure of con-
temporary social capital is the number of voluntary associations per capita. We provide more
information on how we construct our measures of social capital in the next section. As soon as
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freedom of association was enshrined in the 1978 Constitution, voluntary associations—some
of which constituted formalizations of pre-existing networks—started to emerge throughout
the country. Interestingly, as shown in Figure 2, the civic rights associations (typically neigh-
borhood associations) that were registered in Catalonia during the period 1997 to 2015—after
a Catalan law fully materialized the constitutional right—are located within the boundaries
of the townships, rather than in the main town or village of the municipality. This provides
additional evidence for our hypothesis that social capital was originated around the commons.
5 Data and Empirical Strategy
5.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our measure of social capital in the past is based on the presence of commons in each old
township. Padró i Miquel et al. (2015) use a similar proxy for social capital in China, namely the
presence of village temples. They argue that these village-wide voluntary associations require
collective action to be constructed and maintained. The underlying assumptions that we make,
based on historical evidence, are that townships in the premodern era were mainly founded
during the early stages of the Christian conquest and that each township was endowed with a
set of common goods.
In order to obtain variation in the number of commons in the past, we exploit the fact
that small townships merged to form modern municipalities. As we have explained above,
in the region we study —Catalonia—there were more than 2,000 townships pre-1845 while
currently there are only 948. We therefore measure social capital in the past as the number of
townships (i.e., the number of networks which emerged around common goods) that a current
municipality had in 1800.
Following Putnam (1993), Buonanno et al. (2009) and Guiso et al. (2016), among others,
we use the number of voluntary associations per capita at the municipal level as our measure
of contemporary social capital. Data on associations comes from the Department of Justice of
the Government of Catalonia and contains all legal entities registered in Catalonia from 1942
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to 2015.7
In total, 70,593 entities were registered during this period in Catalonia, most of them only af-
ter Spain transitioned into a democratic regime (1978). In 1941, two years after General Franco
had won the Civil War (1936-1939) and established a dictatorship, a decree banning associa-
tions was passed. More than two decades later, Act 191/1964 approved the establishment of
certain types of associations—those that were in line with the principles of the regime—subject
to the authorization of governmental authorities. Freedom of association was recognized as
a fundamental right in article 22 of the 1978 Constitution, adopted three years after General
Franco’s death, but the prior authorization requirement remained in force. We therefore can-
not assume that the organizations registered under the dictatorship are a good proxy for social
capital, and accordingly, we will conduct our analysis by sub-periods. In 1997, the Parlia-
ment of Catalonia passed a law fully implementing the constitutional right of association;8 it
replaced the 1964 Act and removed the requirement.
The Catalan Associations Act (Llei d’Associacions) provides for the creation of a register of
“entities” (Registre d’Entitats). Associations are, by far, the most common type of legal entity
registered (95%), and are defined as non-profit organizations, voluntarily formed by three or
more individuals to serve a general or specific interest, through the sharing of personal re-
sources, temporarily or indefinitely. The second most common type of organization registered
are foundations (3.6%). The most significant difference between an association and a founda-
tion is that the creation of a foundation requires assets and it can only pursue general-interest
objectives. Moreover, the governing bodies of an association are the general assembly and the
board of directors, while the foundation has a board of trustees. The remaining types of legal
entities in the register are federations (1.14%), professional associations (0.21%) and religious
entities (0.10%).9
According to their main purpose, these organizations can be classified as serving to pro-
mote culture (45%), civic rights (12%), scientific knowledge and learning (10.3%), economic
7Table 12 in the appendix lists all data sources.
8Law 7/1991, of June 18th, on Associations.
9We refer in this text to “associations” as they constitute the bulk of entities and best reflect the type of social
capital we are focusing on, but in fact have included all types of entities in the register in our data.
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interests of certain groups (i.e., lobbying) (10%), social care and health (7.3%) and environmen-
tal protection (4.8%).10
5.2 Empirical Strategy
To analyze the persistence of social capital, we first regress our contemporary measure of so-
cial capital (associations at the municipal level per 1,000 inhabitants) on our measure of social
capital in the past (number of old townships that formed the municipality), controlling for
a number of characteristics at the municipal level, as well as for unobserved time-invariant
differences at the local (district) level:11
yi = α + βxi + γcovariatesi + λrdistrictr + εi (1)
where yi is the number of associations per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality i, xi is the num-
ber of old townships that form the current municipality, covariatesi is a vector of covariates,
and εi is the error term. Our hypothesis is that municipalities with more communal goods in
the past currently have a denser network of associations.
The main concern with equation (1) is that xi might not be exogenous. For instance, town-
ships with more social-minded individuals might have voluntarily merged together and have
more social capital today. To address this concern we take advantage of a natural experiment:
we exploit the variation that the 1845 Act generated in the number of townships that each
modern municipality has, based only on their population in 1845. Our first approach uses the
number of townships that merged with others because they had ≤ 30 householders in 1845 as
an instrument for the total number of townships that form the current municipality.
Because our instrument is correlated with having small townships with a lower popula-
tion count, a potential threat to the validity of this instrument arises. The exclusion restriction
would be violated if, for instance, the population dynamics that determined having lower pop-
10The remaining share (10.7%) appears as ’unclassified’ in the dataset.
11The judicial districts (partidos judiciales, also termed “districts” in this text) are the territorial units for the
administration of justice. The first division into these administrative units dates from 1834. There are 49 judicial
districts in Catalonia.
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ulation had a direct influence on contemporary social capital. This would be the case if, for
instance, some unobserved characteristic of the terrain had kept the population from growing
and at the same time exerted a negative impact on social capital today. As we explain in detail
below, to account for this we apply two different strategies. First, we restrict our IV estimation
to a sub-sample of small municipalities which have, by definition, similar population dynam-
ics. Second, we rely on an RD strategy in which we exploit the fact that there is a discontinuous
change in the number of total townships subsumed into the modern main town or village as
a function of its having a population of more than 30 householders, and we compare the as-
sociational density of municipalities that fell just below or just above the population threshold
established by the 1845 Act.
6 Results
6.1 Long-Lasting Social Capital: OLS Results
Table 1 reports the OLS for the entire sample. Regarding the number of associations registered
during the period 1942-2015, our results show that each additional old township merged into
the modern municipality (and therefore, each additional network of collective-action institu-
tions) is related to more associations per capita. In model (3), in which we include the full set
of covariates—district fixed-effects, geographic, climatic and additional population controls—
we find that one more old township increases by 0.77 the number of associations per 1,000
inhabitants (4.4% of the sample mean).
Next, in Table 2 we analyze two different periods: associations registered during Franco’s
dictatorship and in its immediate aftermath (Panel A: 1942-1978), and associations registered
during democracy (Panel B: 1979-2015). Our analysis by sub-periods reflects the different
meaning of our dependent variable as a function of political system. In Panel A, results show
that municipalities with more social capital in the past registered fewer associations under au-
tocracy. In particular, focusing on model (3), we find that having one additional old township
in a municipality decreases by 0.05 the number of associations per 1,000 inhabitants registered
during 1942-1978 (4.2% of the sample mean).
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Conversely, when considering the period in which the Constitution enshrined freedom of
association, we find a positive impact. Our estimates from model (3) in Panel B show that
1 additional old township is associated with 0.8 additional associations per 1,000 inhabitants
registered during 1979-2015 (4.9% of the sample mean).
6.2 Long-Lasting Social Capital: IV Results
As we have explained before, one potential problem with the OLS estimation is that our mea-
sure of social capital in the past—the number of old townships—might be endogenous. In
order to address this we exploit a historical episode that generated exogenous variation in our
variable of interest. We construct an instrumental variable, zi, which is equal to the number of
mergers that took place due to the application of the 1845 Act (i.e., the number of old townships
that merged because they had ≤ 30 householders in 1845).
In a first stage, we check the relevance of our instrument by testing its impact on the total
number of old townships that form a current municipality, xi (our measure of social capital in
the past):
xi = α1 + β1zi + γcovariatesi + λrdistrictr + ε1i (2)
In a second stage, we plug in the predicted values from equation (2) into the following equa-
tion, which captures the causal relationship of interest between contemporary social capital, yi
and past social capital, xi. By doing this we are using only the variation in xi that is generated
by an exogenous factor, namely having ≤ 30 householders in 1845.
yi = α2 + β2x̂i + γcovariatesi + λrdistrictr + ε2i (3)
Table 3 reports the results of the IV estimation. Panel A shows the first-stage coefficients
which confirm the relevance and strength of our instrument: the numbers of mergers due to
the application of the 1845 Act are positively associated with the total number of old townships
that form a modern municipality and the F-statistic is large in all our specifications.
Regarding the second stage, the results for the autocratic period, shown in Panel B, confirm
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the negative findings of the OLS regression: an additional old township decreases in -0.08 the
number of associations per 1,000 registered during this period (around 6.7% of the sample
mean). When taking all the organizations registered since 1979 (Panel C), we find that one
additional old township increases in 0.9 the number of associations per 1,000 inhabitants (5.5%
of the sample mean). If we only analyze the period after which no previous authorization
was required for registering an association, from 1997 until 2015 (Panel D), we find a slightly
higher effect in relative terms: an increase in 1 old township adds 0.7 associations per 1,000
inhabitants, which represents 6.5% of the sample mean.
Our instrument is correlated with the past inclusion of small townships with a low pop-
ulation. This would threaten the validity of our instrument if current social capital were de-
termined by the same factors that led to a low population count in 1845. For instance, this
could be the case if some unobserved terrain feature both kept the population small and had a
negative impact on social capital. In order to address this, we apply two different strategies.
First, we re-run the IV analysis with a restricted sample of municipalities. We keep only
those municipalities in which mergers occurred due to the 1845 Act and those municipalities in
which nothing happened between 1800 and 2015, and then we drop the ones in which the main
town had 60 householders or more in 1845. Our restricted sample comprises 292 municipalities
with similar population dynamics.12
The IV results with the restricted sample are shown in Table 4. Overall, the estimates are
slightly larger than the ones found with the entire sample. One more township merged is asso-
ciated with around 1.3 more associations per 1,000 inhabitants in the period 1979-2015 (about
6.2% of the sample mean). When we look at the 1997-2015 period, one more township merged
is associated with 1.1 more associations per 1,000 inhabitants (8.2% of the sample mean). If
we conduct the analysis with the associations registered during 1979-1996 only—during the
early stages of democracy, but before the passing of the law that developed the constitutional
right of association in Catalonia—we do not find a significant effect of the commons. These last
results, shown in Table 13 in the appendix, confirm that the positive relationship between the
12The IV regressions with the restricted sample include the same covariates as the regressions with the entire
sample, the only difference being that we include province fixed effects instead of district fixed effects because of
the sample size.
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commons in the past and contemporary social capital is driven by the associations registered
once the legislation developing freedom of association was fully in place in Catalonia.
6.3 Results with Different Types of Associations
In order to better understand the nature of the social capital we are analyzing, we focus on dif-
ferent categories of associations based on their main activities (cultural, civic rights, scientific
knowledge and learning, pursing joint economic interests, health and social welfare, and envi-
ronmental protection). We re-run the IV estimation, using the restricted sample to account for
potential unobserved differences between the larger and smaller municipalities, and we limit
the analysis to the period 1997-2015.
We only find statistically significant results when analyzing cultural and civic rights associ-
ations. These results are reported in Table 5.13 Cultural and civic rights associations account for
45% and 12% of the total, respectively. Our results for cultural associations are shown in Panel
A of Table 5. The estimated coefficient is 0.3-0.4, meaning that one additional merger is associ-
ated with 0.3-0.4 more cultural associations per 1,000 inhabitants registered during the period
1997-2015, or about 5.4% of the sample mean. The persistent effect of social capital found
seems to be mainly driven by the civic rights associations, as shown in Panel B. The magnitude
of the effect is larger and precisely estimated: our results show that an increase in 1 additional
old township is associated with 0.5 more civic rights associations per 1,000 inhabitants in the
period 1997-2015, or 25% of the sample mean.
These civic rights associations are typically neighborhood associations, which link people
primarily based on their residence. In this sense they can be considered as representing the
bonding type of social capital. However, neighborhood associations could be bridging in some
other dimensions since, apart from the geographical criteria, they tend to be inclusive and
group together individuals with different gender, age, and social class.
13Results for the remaining categories are shown in Table 14 in the appendix.
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6.4 Long-Lasting Social Capital: RD Results
Our second strategy to address the potential threat to the exclusion restriction of our IV is
to apply a Regression Discontinuity Design. We exploit the discontinuity generated by the
population threshold established in the 1845 Act to estimate the change in the number of old
townships that form a modern municipality. In particular, we keep only those municipalities
that had some merger during the implementation period of the 1845 Act (1845-1854) and those
for which nothing happened since 1800 (i.e., the ones that have always been a single municipal
entity). We also drop any new municipalities formed through division.
We focus on the time period and the type of associations that we have already shown to
be more closely linked to the commons, namely, civic rights associations registered during the
period 1997-2015. Our running variable in the RD regression is the population in 1845 of the
township that eventually became the main town in the modern municipality. We first run the
following regression:
xi = α3 + β3Over30i + f (pop1845) + ε3i (4)
Table 6 reports these first-stage results in Panel A. We estimate that modern municipalities
where the main town or village had more than 30 householders in 1845 comprise on average
1.7 fewer old townships than similar municipalities where the main town had 30 householders
or less in 1845 and therefore were forced to merge with other townships. Figure 3 (upper
panel) shows the corresponding graph in which we can appreciate that the discontinuity when
crossing the threshold is clearly visible.
The underlying identifying assumption is the following: if we expect everything else that
could affect social capital today to behave smoothly across this threshold, then, if we find a
discontinuity in contemporary associations at this same threshold, we can attribute it to those
mergers. Because we are comparing municipalities where the main town had a very similar
population size in 1845 this RD strategy overcomes the validity threats of our IV estimation.
Figure 4 explores the smoothness of several relevant variables at this same threshold. We
first examine whether there is a discontinuity in the resulting population size in 1845 and in the
total land area of the newly formed municipalities. The lack of discontinuity speaks in favor
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of our hypothesis and rules out the alternative hypothesis of a simple ’group effect’, i.e., that
the amalgamation of more individuals and a greater total land area is what causes the increase
in social capital.14 We are comparing municipalities with very similar population and land
size and the only thing that differs among them is the number of townships (or networks) that
merged.
In the lower panel of Figure 4 we analyze the smoothness of the literacy rates in 1860 and
1900, respectively. We view these variables as proxies of local public-good provisions, since
primary education was a municipal responsibility until the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury.15 Again, we find no discontinuity at the 30-householders threshold, neither a decade nor
fifty years after the merging process was completed.16 We interpret this as suggestive evidence
that there were no significant changes in local governance that could have fostered an increase
in social capital in the municipality. In Section 7.2 we analyze some present-day institutional
differences—by looking at government transparency and citizen participation—and again find
no evidence of differences in contemporary local governance.
An additional identifying assumption is that there is no manipulation of the forcing variable
(householders in the main town of the modern municipality in 1845). We follow McCrary
(2008) density test and find no evidence of discontinuity at the threshold. The results of this
test are shown in Table 7 and its corresponding Figure 5. Regardless of the bandwidth used,
we can never reject that the discontinuity estimate is equal to zero at a 10% significance level
or lower.
Next, we apply the same regression framework as in equation (4) but use the number of
civic rights associations per capita registered in the period 1997-2015 as the dependent vari-
14The RD coefficient and standard error for the regression on population in 1845 is -80.6 and 58.6, respectively.
For the land size of the modern municipality these figures are -5.5 and 9.2, respectively.
15In 1902 the central government began to pay schoolteachers directly.




yi = α4 + β4Over30i + f (pop1845) + ε4i (5)
Results for β4 are reported in Panel B of Table 6, and the discontinuity is shown in a graph
in Figure 3 (lower panel). Overall, our results show that those municipalities where the main
towns had more than 30 householders in 1845 (and therefore had fewer mergers) have 2.7 fewer
civic rights associations per 1,000 inhabitants registered in the period 1997-2015.







or equivalently, run a 2SLS estimation, in which we use the predicted values of xi from
equation (4) and plug them into the causal relationship of interest:
yi = γ + ρx̂i + f (pop1845) + f (pop2015) + ui (6)
The estimated coefficient is reported in Panel C of Table 6. It shows that for those munici-
palities that resulted from a merger because their main township had 30 householders or less
in 1845, 1 additional merger is associated with 1.5 more associations per 1,000 inhabitants (ap-
proximately 75% of the sample mean). This effect is larger than the one estimated using the
IV, and confirms the long-lasting effect of the commons in today’s density of neighborhood
associations.
As a robustness check, Figure 6 shows similar first-stage and reduced-form graphs for a
smaller bandwidth of 25 householders on each side of the threshold.18 We also explore in
17To account for current population, we first regress yi on a second-order polynomial of 2015 population, and
use the predicted residuals as the dependent variable in equation 4. Population in 2015 is winsorized at 5%
to account for outliers. In all the RD regressions, we address the fact that the forcing variable is discrete, and
consequently the regression is prone to specification error, by clustering the standard errors by householders (Lee
and Card 2008).
18The RD coefficient and standard error (in parenthesis) in the upper panel is -1.34 (0.75) and, -2.46 (0.94) in the
below panel (n = 270).
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Figure 7 a placebo RD at the 100-inhabitants threshold (instead of 30 householders) and, reas-
suringly, find no discontinuity at this different threshold.19
6.5 Impact of Social Capital on Economic Development: IV Results
Our next goal is to analyze the impact of social capital on economic development. Social capital
is considered the missing ingredient in explaining the persistence of differences in economic
development. Hall and Jones (1999) referred to the concept of social infrastructure as providing
“an environment that supports productive activities and encourages capital accumulation, skill
acquisition, invention, and technology transfer”.
This empirical analysis is challenging mainly for two reasons. First, there might be reverse
causality, since richer municipalities might develop more social capital rather than the other
way around. Second, omitted variables (e.g., better institutions which might foster both growth
and social capital) could bias the results.
We address these endogeneity issues applying an IV strategy. Our instrument for contem-
porary social capital—which has been validated in the previous sections—is the number of
mergers as a consequence of having ≤ 30 householders in 1845. We measure economic de-
velopment as the income-tax base per capita, which has the advantage of being available for
municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants (around 460 municipalities). Information on
GDP is only available for municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants (slightly over 200).
We run a first-stage regression similar to the one looking at the persistence of social capital:
xi = α1 + β1zi + γcovariatesi + λrProvincer + ε1i (7)
where xi is our previous measure of social capital, i.e., associations per capita. Due to sam-
ple size limitations, we include Provincer, province fixed effects, instead of district fixed effects,
and we use a large subset of our climatic variables.20 Also, we cluster the standard errors at
19The RD coefficient and standard error (in parenthesis) in the upper panel is -0.28 (1.04) and, -0.81 (1.71) in the
below panel.
20We no longer include distance to a river, standard deviation of temperature (which is highly correlated with
distance to the sea) and standard deviation of rainfall (which is highly correlated to elevation).
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the district level to account for potential residential sorting across adjacent municipalities (e.g.,
richer individuals might choose to live in the same local set of municipalities within the same
district).
In the second stage, we plug the predicted values from equation (7) into the following equa-
tion, which captures the causal relationship of interest between contemporary economic devel-
opment, yi, and social capital, using only the variation in xi generated by the 1845 Act:
yi = α2 + β2x̂i + γcovariatesi + λrProvincer + ε2i (8)
We first run the IV regression only with population, geographic and climatic controls, and
subsequently include known drivers of economic development: human capital, innovation,
roads and public infrastructure, financial capital and police force size. We also control for
tourism activity in the municipality, in case a higher number of old townships—and their cor-
respondent historical sites—attracts more tourists, which would violate the exclusion restric-
tion. All these variables are measured at the municipal level for the year 2015 or the closest
available year.
Table 8 and 9 show the results. In Table 8 social capital is measured as all associations
registered during the period 1997-2015, while Table 9 focuses only on civic rights associations
registered in the same period (per 1,000 inhabitants). In both cases, Panel A shows strong and
significant first stage results, meaning that the number of mergers due to the 1845 Act is a
powerful predictor of the density of associations in the last two decades. In Panel B we present
the IV results, which are again statistically significant and remarkably stable throughout the
specifications. For all association types, focusing on Table 8, an increase of 1 is associated with
an increase of around 500 euros in the income-tax base per capita. The effect is larger when we
analyze civic rights associations only (Table 9): an increase of 1 in the number of civic rights
associations per 1,000 inhabitants is associated with an increase of around 1,400 euros in the
income-tax base per capita.21
We analyze the impact of social capital on the economic development in previous years.
Our explanatory variable is the number of civic rights associations per 1,000 inhabitants reg-
21Table 15 in the appendix shows the reduced-form results.
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istered during the period 1997-2005 in Table 16, and 1997-2010 in Table 17 in the appendix.
The dependent variable is the income-tax base per capita in 2005 and 2010, respectively.22 Our
results suggest that the positive effects of social capital on economic development are concen-
trated during the first years in which associational rights were defined, and that they would
diminish over time.
7 Additional Results
7.1 Alternative Measures of Social Capital
So far, we have measured current social capital as the density of the associative network, which
relates closely to our measure of social capital in the past: the networks that arose around the
commons. However, social capital is a broad concept that does not only encompass networks
but also shared values and beliefs, as well as pro-social behavior. In this section, we explore
alternative definitions of social capital and analyze whether they are also related to the com-
mons.
7.1.1 Perceptions of Civic Behavior, Social Interaction, Resident Engagement
We use the Public Safety Survey for Catalonia, which was primarily designed to collect individ-
uals’ experiences of and opinions on crime, policing and security. Conveniently for us, the 2012
edition introduced a module regarding individual perceptions of good citizenship, and the de-
gree to which neighbors connect to each other and are involved in community issues. These
are the three measures we consider as proxies of social capital. In fact, one could also consider
these variables as a measure of pro-social behavior, which is a slightly different facet of social
capital.23 The survey is conducted at the individual level; we aggregate the information at the
22All covariates are computed at the closest available year in each table.
23The three specific questions are the following: “On a scale from 0 (none) to 10 (a lot), how do you value
the level of good citizenship in your municipality?”; “Regarding the people in your neighborhood/municipality,
how often do you interact with them in a scale from 0 (I do not interact with anybody) to 10 (I have relationships
with many people)”; “Regarding the following problems: impoliteness of your neighbors, bad shape of urban
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municipal level and end up with a sample of 104 municipalities.
In Table 18 in the appendix we present basic univariate regressions of these three proxies
of social capital on our main variable of social capital—number of associations per capita. We
limit our analysis to the period comprised between the passing of the Law on Associations Act
in 1997 in Catalonia and the survey year (2012), and distinguish between total associations,
civic rights associations only, and cultural associations only. Regardless of the definition of
associational activity we use, we find statistically significant and positive correlations between
these variables.
Next, we run our IV regressions using these three proxies of social capital as outcome vari-
ables. Results are shown in Table 10, and point again to a positive relationship between the
experiences of collaboration around the commons in the past and today’s pro-social behavior
at the municipal level.
7.1.2 Blood Donations
Blood donations are considered a measure of individual altruism but could also be conceptu-
alized as a social phenomenon embedded in the community. We collected data from the “Banc
de Sang i Teixits” (Blood and Tissue Bank) of the Catalan Health Department. This data has one
key limitation for our analysis: it provides the number of donations collected in each munici-
pality regardless of donor origin. This can be problematic since not all municipalities provide
this service and individuals are therefore forced to travel to other towns if they want to donate
blood. Figure 8 in the appendix shows the reduced-form RD graphs of an index of blood do-
nation at the municipal level (averaged for the period 2007-2015, and for 2015 only). We do not
find any significant discontinuity at the 30-householder threshold in 1845. However, because
of the data limitations explained, we interpret these results with caution.
amenities, noise, uncleanliness, presence of drug-users or drug-dealers, disruptive youth, prostitutes, homeless
people and beggars; how do you value your neighbors’ behavior on a scale from 0 (they don’t do anything about
it) to 10 (they do a lot)?”.
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7.2 Government Transparency and Citizen Participation
Government transparency helps citizens to make informed decisions and hold their represen-
tatives accountable, and in this sense it allows good governance. We attempt to gauge whether
there is an impact of social capital on the quality of local governance by constructing a trans-
parency index at the municipal level.
For this purpose, we use data collected by the Pi i Sunyer Foundation for year 2017. We
select 82 questions that deal with different dimensions of transparency, for instance proactive
disclosure of personal and financial information, and assessment of public services, and con-
struct an index which ranges between 0 (no transparency at all) to 1 (maximum transparency).
Additionally, we focus on three of these questions to construct an index of citizen participation,
initiated by the local government.24
The reduced-form RD graphs for these two variables are shown in Figure 9 in the appendix.
We do not find any significant change in neither the transparency index nor the citizen partic-
ipation index when crossing the 30-householders threshold. This suggests that the higher co-
operation and trust developed at the citizens’ level due to the former presence of the commons
does not lead to more transparent governance and citizen engagement. We thus hypothesize
that the persistence of social capital over time, long after the commons disappeared, is due to
its cultural transmission across generations rather than due to alternative institutional channels
at the local level.
8 Conclusions
In this project we aim to understand the historical origins of social capital, to document its
long-term persistence as well as its effects on economic development by focusing on the legacy
24Regarding the transparency index, its average is 0.50, standard deviation 0.13, and minimum and maximum
values 0.13 and 0.93, respectively. As for the citizen participation index it varies between 0 and 1, has a mean o
0.52 and a standard deviation of 0.31. The three questions we use to measure citizen engagement are: (1) “does
the local government identify channels for citizen participation?”; (2) “is there information regarding the channels
for citizen participation?”; and (3) “are there spaces (websites, brochures, etc.) dedicated to citizen engagement?”.
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of the commons in a Spanish region (Catalonia). Common goods are resources (forests, pas-
ture, irrigation systems, etc.) that are used collectively according to certain rules. In early
medieval times, common goods were granted to townships and were managed collectively by
the local residents, a fact which enabled the establishment of institutions for collective action
and self-government. Common goods persisted until the second half of the nineteenth century,
when some modernizing reforms, especially the Disentailment Act of 1855, contributed to their
disappearance. We argue that the experience of cooperation and mutual trust among villagers,
repeated over centuries, increased the stock of social capital in each local community.
In 1845, a law forced small municipalities to merge with others. We exploit the exogenous
variation that this law generated in the number of mergers (i.e., the number of cooperative net-
works that merged) that formed each modern municipality. Our results show that municipal-
ities composed of more townships currently have a denser network of voluntary associations.
We show that the persistence of social capital is mainly driven by neighborhood associations
that uphold and promote the civic rights of local communities, a type of association which
proliferated throughout Catalan municipalities since 1997, once the regional parliament had
defined the rights and rules governing associations. We also explore alternative measures of
social capital, and the mechanisms behind its persistence.
This exercise allows us to obtain a valid instrument for social capital to identify its causal
impact on economic development. We find that social capital measured as associational life
has a positive impact on economic development at the municipal level. With this study, we
aim to contribute to the literature on social capital by providing a comprehensive theory of its
determinants and exploiting a convincing source of exogenous variation.
Even though we focus our study on the legacy of the commons in a Spanish region, we
believe that our results can be generalized to other contexts. After all, the commons are an
ancient institution which managed to survive for a long time in rural and small towns in most
cases, and was widespread around the world, especially in pre-industrial Europe.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: OLS Results. Long-lasting Effects on Voluntary Associations 1942-2015
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 17.5 (12.9)
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Old Townships 0.38* 0.72*** 0.77***
(0.202) (0.192) (0.189)
Adj-R2 0.13 0.28 0.29
Observations 913 913 913
Judicial District FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic & climatic controls No Yes Yes
Additional population controls No No Yes
The dependent variable is the number of associations registered during the
period 1942-2015 in a given municipality, divided by the population in 2015
and multiplied by 1,000. All models include population size measured in 2015
and 1845, and municipal land area. Geographic and climatic controls include
elevation, ruggedness, distance to the sea and to a river, mean and standard
deviation of rainfall, and mean and standard deviation of temperatures. Ad-
ditional population controls include population squared both in 1845 and in
2015 and an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a municipality has more
than 100,000 inhabitants in 2015. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2: OLS Results. Long-lasting Effects on Voluntary Associations by Sub-Periods
Panel A: 1942-1978
(1) (2) (3)
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 1.2 (2.9)
Number of Old Townships -0.07** -0.06** -0.05*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Adj-R2 0.12 0.13 0.13
Observations 909 909 909
Panel B: 1979-2015
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 16.4 (12.3)
Number of Old Townships 0.46** 0.78*** 0.82***
(0.200) (0.192) (0.189)
Adj-R2 0.14 0.27 0.28
Observations 913 913 913
Judicial District FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic & climatic controls No Yes Yes
Additional population controls No No Yes
The dependent variable is the number of associations registered during 1942-
1978 in Panel A and during 1979-2015 in Panel B in a given municipality, di-
vided by the population in 1978 and multiplied by 1,000. All models include
population size measured in 1978 in Panel A and 2015 in Panel B and 1845,
and municipal land area. Geographic and climatic controls include elevation,
ruggedness, distance to the sea and to a river, mean and standard deviation of
rainfall, and mean and standard deviation of temperatures. Additional popu-
lation controls include population squared both in 1845 and in 1978 (Panel A)
or 2015 (Panel B) and an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a munic-
ipality has more than 100,000 inhabitants in 2015. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: IV Results. Long-lasting Effects on Voluntary Associations by Sub-Periods
Panel A: First-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 2.3 (2.7)
N. Mergers Law 1845 1.05*** 1.04*** 1.05***
(0.041) (0.039) (0.038)
F-statistic 651.8 724.1 754.5
Panel B: Second-Stage Results (1942-1978)
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 1.2 (2.9)
Number of Old Townships -0.07** -0.08** -0.08**
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Centered-R2 0.17 0.19 0.19
Observations 913 913 913
Panel C: Second-Stage Results (1979-2015)
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 16.4 (12.3)
Number of Old Townships 0.86*** 0.93*** 0.91***
(0.261) (0.246) (0.240)
Centered-R2 0.18 0.32 0.33
Panel D: Second-Stage Results (1997-2015)
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 10.2 (8.6)
Number of Old Townships 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.65***
(0.199) (0.190) (0.186)
Centered-R2 0.13 0.21 0.22
Observations 913 913 913
Judicial District FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic & climatic controls No Yes Yes
Additional population controls No No Yes
All models include population size measured in 1978 (in Panel B) and 2015 (in
Panel C and D) and 1845, and municipal land area. Geographic and climatic
controls include elevation, ruggedness, distance to the sea and to a river, mean
and standard deviation of rainfall, and mean and standard deviation of tem-
peratures. Additional population controls include population squared both in
1845 and in 1978/2015 and an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a mu-
nicipality has more than 100,000 inhabitants in 2015. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: IV Results with Restricted Sample. Long-lasting Effects on Voluntary Associations
1979-2015
Panel A: First-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 3.1 (3.3)
N. Mergers Law 1845 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.93***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.056)
F-statistic 330.8 311.0 279.3
Panel B: Second-Stage Results (1979-2015)
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 21 (15.5)
Number of Old Townships 1.29*** 1.30*** 1.29***
(0.337) (0.332) (0.328)
Centered-R2 0.11 0.21 0.25
Panel C: Second-Stage Results (1997-2015)
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 13.1 (11.4)
Number of Old Townships 1.11*** 1.03*** 1.08***
(0.295) (0.278) (0.288)
Centered-R2 0.08 0.15 0.18
Observations 292 292 292
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic & climatic controls No Yes Yes
Additional population controls No No Yes
All models include population size measured in 2015 and 1845, and municipal
land area. Geographic and climatic controls include elevation, ruggedness,
distance to the sea and to a river, mean and standard deviation of rainfall, and
mean and standard deviation of temperatures. Additional population controls
include population squared both in 1845 and in 2015. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: IV Results by Types of Associations, with Restricted Sample, 1997-2015
Panel A: Second-Stage Results Cultural Associations
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 6 (6.9)
Number of Old Townships 0.28* 0.30* 0.37**
(0.166) (0.168) (0.166)
Centered-R2 0.06 0.08 0.10
Panel B: Second-Stage Results Civic Rights Associations
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 2 (3.4)
Number of Old Townships 0.50*** 0.46*** 0.47***
(0.125) (0.123) (0.130)
Centered-R2 0.23 0.27 0.27
Observations 292 292 292
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic & climatic controls No Yes Yes
Additional population controls No No Yes
All models include population size measured in 2015 and 1845, and municipal
land area. Geographic and climatic controls include elevation, ruggedness,
distance to the sea and to a river, mean and standard deviation of rainfall, and
mean and standard deviation of temperatures. Additional population controls
include population squared both in 1845 and in 2015. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: RD Results. Long-lasting Effects on Civic Rights Associations During 1997-2015
Panel A: First-Stage Results
>30 householders in 1845 -1.7**
(0.85)
Panel B: Reduced-Form Results
>30 householders in 1845 -2.7***
(0.90)
Panel C: 2SLS Results




The unit of observation is the capital of the modern municipality. The
model includes controls for population and population squared in
1845, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if population is higher
than the threshold (30 householders), and the interaction terms be-
tween population in 1845 (and its squared) with the dummy variable.
Population in 2015 is winsorized at the 0.05 level. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the householders level in 1845. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 7: McCrary Density Test of Manipulation of the Running Variable
Default bandwidth (11.4) Bandwidth=9 Bandwidth=14
Discontinuity estimate 0.32 0.27 0.34
(0.35) (0.40) (0.32)
These results are obtained using the Stata command DCdensity which followed McCrary (2008). The discontinuity estimate is
expressed as the log difference in height. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8: IV Results. Income Tax Base per Capita 2015 with All Associations (1997-2015)
Panel A: First-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dependent Var. 6.8 (3)
N. Mergers Law 1845 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.068) (0.070)
F-statistic 48.5 49.5 48 49.1 48.7 41.2 40.7
Panel B: Second-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dependent Var. 20,016.5 (3,846)
All assoc pc (97-15) 498.6** 514.2*** 531.6*** 557.4*** 534.1*** 544.4*** 500.5***
(213.9) (156.2) (159.5) (156.7) (144.3) (157.8) (150.3)
Human Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Innovation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Roads & Public Infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Capital Yes Yes Yes
Police Forces Yes Yes
Tourism Yes
Observations 434 434 434 434 434 434 434
Centered-R2 0.22 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.45
All models include a second-order polynomial function of the population measured in 2015 and 1845, municipal land area,
elevation, ruggedness, distance to the sea, mean rainfall, mean temperature, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if
a municipality has more than 100,000 inhabitants, and province fixed effects. Additional controls include the percentage of
citizens with secondary or college education in 2001, patents per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015, road density in 1990, sports facilities
per 1,000 inhabitants in 2016, and libraries per 1,000 inhabitants in 2014, bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants in 2002, local police
officers per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015, and hotels per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015. Clustered standard errors at the district level in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 9: IV Results. Income Tax Base per Capita 2015 with Civic Rights Associations (1997-
2015)
Panel A: First-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dependent Var. 0.71 (0.71)
N. Mergers Law 1845 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037)
F-statistic 27.5 27.2 27.5 23.7 23.6 23.1 19.2
Panel B: Second-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dependent Var. 20,016.5 (3,846)
Civic rights assoc pc (97-15) 1,365.8** 1,407*** 1,445.3*** 1,480.1*** 1,448.8*** 1,462*** 1,363**
(684.1) (519.6) (532.7) (537.9) (524.3) (540.6) (559.7)
Human Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Innovation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Roads & Public Infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Capital Yes Yes Yes
Police Forces Yes Yes
Tourism Yes
Observations 434 434 434 434 434 434 434
Centered-R2 0.29 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49
All models include a second-order polynomial function of the population measured in 2015 and 1845, municipal land area, elevation,
ruggedness, distance to the sea, mean rainfall, mean temperature, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a municipality has more
than 100,000 inhabitants, and province fixed effects. Additional controls include the percentage of citizens with secondary or college
education in 2001, patents per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015, road density in 1990, sports facilities per 1,000 inhabitants in 2016, and libraries
per 1,000 inhabitants in 2014, bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants in 2002, local police officers per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015, and hotels
per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015. Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 10: IV Results with Civic Behavior, Social Interaction and Resident Engagemant
Panel A: First-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 2.4 (3.6)
Number of Old Townships 1.43*** 1.24***
(0.04) (0.07)
F-statistic 1,332.6 288.4
Panel B: Second-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 6.1 (0.5)
Civic Behavior 0.02*** 0.03*
(0.006) (0.017)
Centered-R2 0.07 0.22
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 7.6 (0.6)
Social Interaction 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.010) (0.017)
Centered-R2 0.17 0.36
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 4.4 (0.7)




Additional controls No Yes
All models include population of the municipality measured in 2012 and 1845.
Additional controls include include municipal land area, elevation, rugged-
ness, distance to the sea, mean and standard deviation of rainfall, mean and
standard deviation of temperatures, and a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if a municipality has more than 100,000 inhabitants. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 1: Changes in the Municipal Map of Catalonia (1800-2015)
Own elaboration based on Burgueño and Lasso de la Vega (2002). The dots show all types of associations registered during period 1942-2015.
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Figure 2: Mergers and Civic Rights Associations 1997-2015 (Zoomed-in View)
Own elaboration from historical maps. In light grey we show old townships that became the main town or village of modern municipalities.
In dark grey we show small townships merged with others during the period 1845-1854. The black lines delimit the borders of current
municipalities, and the hatched ones the borders of the old townships. The dots depict the presence of a civic rights association registered
during the period 1997-2015. Municipalities left blank are not included in our RD sample (i.e., their main town or village had more than 60
householders in 1845, they did not experience any merge during during the implementation period of the 1845 Act, or they were newly
established as a result of some division process).
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Figure 3: RD Results
In the upper panel, the dots are the average number of old townships in 1800. In the lower one, the dots are the averaged residuals of a
regression of the number of voluntary associations that promote civic rights in the period 1997-2015 on population in 2015 (second order
polynomial and winsorized at the 5% level). The lines are regression fits from a model of the number of old townships in 1800 in the upper
panel, and the number of voluntary associations in 1997-2015 in the lower one, on population in 1845 and its squared, a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if population is higher than the threshold (30 householders) and the interaction terms of population in 1845 (and its square)
with the dummy variable.
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Figure 4: Placebo RD Results. Smoothness of Other Variables: Population Size 1845, Area and
Literacy Rates in 1860 and 1900
The dots are the average number of old townships in 1800. The lines are regression fits from a model of the number of old townships in 1800
on population in 1845 and its square, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if population is higher than the threshold (30 householders)
and the interaction terms of population in 1845 (and its squared) with the dummy variable.
Figure 5: McCrary Density Test of Manipulation of the Running Variable
Own elaboration using the Stata command DCdensity. The first panel uses the default bandwidth provided by the program (11.4), the
second one is set by the authors at 9 and the third one at 14.
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Figure 6: RD Results with Smaller Bandwidth
In the upper panel, the dots are the average number of old townships in 1800. In the lower one, the dots are the averaged residuals of a
regression of the number of voluntary associations that promote civic rights in the period 1997-2015 on population in 2015 (second order
polynomial and winsorized at the 5% level). The lines are regression fits from a model of the number of old townships in 1800 in the upper
panel, and the number of voluntary associations in 1997-2015 in the lower one, on population in 1845 and its squared, a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if population is higher than the threshold (30 householders) and the interaction terms of population in 1845 (and its square)
with the dummy variable.
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Figure 7: Placebo RD Results with Threshold at 100 Inhabitants
In the upper panel, the dots are the average number of old townships in 1800. In the lower one, the dots are the averaged residuals of a
regression of the number of voluntary associations that promote civic rights in the period 1997-2015 on population in 2015 (second order
polynomial and winsorized at the 5% level). The lines are regression fits from a model of the number of old townships in 1800 in the upper
panel, and the number of voluntary associations in 1997-2015 in the lower one, on population in 1845 and its squared, a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if population is higher than the threshold (100 inhabitants) and the interaction terms of population in 1845 (and its square)
with the dummy variable.
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Appendix: Additional Tables
Table 11: Effect of Number of Old Townships on Exemptions from Disentailment
Probit Model Poisson Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 0.12 (0.32) 0.05 (0.16)
Number of Old Townships 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.048*** 0.036**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.016) (0.014)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 919 919 919 919
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.60 0.13 0.43
The dependent variable measures the proportion of the municipal area which was
exempted from disentailment, according to the 1901 catalog; it is expressed as a bi-
nary variable in columns (1) and (2). The coefficients of the probit model show the
marginal effects. Additional controls include population density in 1900, elevation
and ruggedness. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Figure 8: RD Results with Blood Donations
The dots are the average number the blood donations index, in the upper panel these are averaged for the period 2007-2015, and the lower
panel shows the index only for 2015. The lines are regression fits from a model of the index of blood donations on population in 1845 and its
square, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if population is higher than the threshold (30 householders) and the interaction terms of
population in 1845 (and its square) with the dummy variable. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are 8.2 (13.4) and 2.8
(12.5) in the upper and lower panel, respectively.
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Figure 9: RD Results with Transparency Index
The dots are the average transparency index in the upper panel, and the average citizen participation index in the lower panel, both at the
municipal level. These indexes are computed in 2017, based on survey questions, and normalized between 0 (lowest
transparency/participation) and 1 (highest transparency/participation). The lines are regression fits from a model of the transparency index
on population in 1845 and its square, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if population is higher than the threshold (30 householders)
and the interaction terms of population in 1845 (and its square) with the dummy variable. The coefficients and standard errors (in
parentheses) are 0.008 (0.037) and -0.028 (0.078) in the upper and lower panel, respectively.
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Table 12: Data Sources
Variables Source
Population (contemporary) National Institute for Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Es-
tadística, INE)
Population in 1845 Diccionario Geográfico-Estadístico-Histórico de España y sus
posesiones de Ultramar, by Pascual Madoz, Madrid 1845-
1850.
Population and literacy rates in 1860 Censo de la población de España según el recuento verificado
en 25 de diciembre de 1860, Junta General de Estadística,
Madrid 1863 (1860 census)
Literacy rates in 1900 Censo de la población de España según el empadronamiento
hecho en la Peninsula é Islas Adyacentes el 31 de diciembre
de 1900, Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico y Es-
tadístico, Madrid, 1902
Voluntary associations Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament de Justícia. Direcció
General de Dret i d’Entitats Jurídiques. Servei de Coordinació
Tècnica i Assessorament d’Entitats de Dret Públic
Climatic and geographic variables Institut Cartogràfic i Geològic de Catalunya
Income tax base per capita Catalan Institute of Statistics (Institut d’Estadística de
Catalunya, IDESCAT)
Human Capital IDESCAT, Cens de Població 2001
Patents Spanish Office of Patents and Trademarks, Ministry of
Industry, Trade and Tourism
Road density Based on Font i Garolera, Jaume (1993), “La formació
històrica de la xarxa de carreteres a Catalunya”, Estudi
General 13: 127-152
Sports facilities IDESCAT, based on Consell Català de l’Esport
Libraries IDESCAT, Estadística de biblioteques
Bank branches IDESCAT, based on the Economic Activities Tax Impost
d’activitats econòmiques (IAE)
Local police officers IDESCAT, based on data from the Catalan Ministry of
Home Affairs
Hotels IDESCAT, based on data from Direcció General de Turisme,
Catalan Department of Business and Occupation
Civic Behavior, Social Interaction, and Resident
Engagement
Public Safety Survey for Catalonia (Enquesta de seguretat
pública de Catalunya). Catalan Ministry of Home Affairs.
2012
Blood donations Banc de Sang i Teixits. Catalan Health Department
Transparency and Citizen Participation Fundació Pi i Sunyer
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Table 13: IV Results with Restricted Sample. Long-lasting Effects on Voluntary Associations
1979-1996
Panel A: First-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 3.1 (3.3)
N. Mergers Law 1845 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.93***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.055)
F-statistic 331.3 311.9 282.3
Panel B: Second-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 8.6 (8.0)
Number of Old Townships 0.14 0.22 0.14
(0.185) (0.194) (0.192)
Observations 292 292 292
Centered-R2 0.13 0.21 0.23
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic & climatic controls No Yes Yes
Additional population controls No No Yes
All models include population size measured in 1996 and 1845, and municipal
land area. Geographic and climatic controls include elevation, ruggedness,
distance to the sea and to a river, mean and standard deviation of rainfall, and
mean and standard deviation of temperatures. Additional population controls
include population squared both in 1845 and in 1996. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 14: IV Results by Types of Associations, with Restricted Sample, 1997-2015. Second-Stage
Results
Panel A: Social Care and Health Associations
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 0.3 (1.2)
Number of Old Townships -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Centered-R2 0.03 0.05 0.05
Panel B: Scientific Knowledge and Learning Associations
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 0.5 (1.2)
Number of Old Townships 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033)
Centered-R2 0.02 0.04 0.04
Panel C: Lobbying Associations
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 1.4 (3.4)
Number of Old Townships 0.15 0.12 0.13
(0.093) (0.092) (0.097)
Centered-R2 0.04 0.06 0.06
Panel D: Environment Protection Associations
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 1.6 (3.5)
Number of Old Townships 0.16 0.13 0.10
(0.095) (0.079) (0.079)
Centered-R2 0.04 0.15 0.16
Observations 292 292 292
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic & climatic controls No Yes Yes
Additional population controls No No Yes
All models include population size measured in 2015 and 1845, and municipal
land area. Geographic and climatic controls include elevation, ruggedness,
distance to the sea and to a river, mean and standard deviation of rainfall, and
mean and standard deviation of temperatures. Additional population controls
include population squared both in 1845 and in 2015. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
51
Table 15: Reduced-Form Results. Income Tax Base per Capita 2015
Mean (St.Dev.) Dependent Var. 20,016.5 (3,846)
N. Mergers Law 1845 219.7** 226.4*** 233*** 242.3*** 236.4*** 238.3*** 222.3***
(88.1) (64.7) (65.1) (63.3) (61.3) (62.4) (63.8)
Human Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Innovation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Roads & Public Infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Capital Yes Yes Yes
Police Forces Yes Yes
Tourism Yes
Observations 434 434 434 434 434 434 434
Centered-R2 0.33 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54
All models include a second-order polynomial function of the population measured in 2015 and 1845, municipal land area,
elevation, ruggedness, distance to the sea, mean rainfall, mean temperature, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if
a municipality has more than 100,000 inhabitants, and province fixed effects. Additional controls include the percentage of
citizens with secondary or college education in 2001, patents per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015, road density in 1990, sports facilities
per 1,000 inhabitants in 2016, and libraries per 1,000 inhabitants in 2014, bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants in 2002, local police
officers per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015, and hotels per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015. Clustered standard errors at the district level in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 16: IV Results. Income Tax Base per Capita 2005 with Civic Rights Associations (1997-
2005)
Year 2005
Panel A: First-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dependent Var. 0.37 (0.52)
N. Mergers Law 1845 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033)
F-statistic 18 18.1 18 17 17.1 16.9 14.8
Panel B: Second-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dependent Var. 15,693.4 (4,146.6)
Civic rights assoc pc (97-05) 1,966.7** 1,964.5*** 2,035.4*** 2,332.2*** 2,288.6*** 2,219.9*** 2,035.4***
(900.4) (604.5) (610.4) (686.4) (673.5) (665.5) (686.7)
Observations 416 416 416 416 416 416 416
Centered-R2 0.29 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.51
Human Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Innovation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Roads & Public Infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Capital Yes Yes Yes
Police Forces Yes Yes
Tourism Yes
All models include a second-order polynomial function of the population measured in 2005 and 1845, municipal land area, elevation, rugged-
ness, distance to the sea, mean rainfall, mean temperature, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a municipality has more than 100,000
inhabitants, and province fixed effects. Additional controls include the percentage of citizens with secondary or college education in 2001,
patents per 1,000 inhabitants in 2008, road density in 1990, sports facilities per 1,000 inhabitants in 2001, and libraries per 1,000 inhabitants in
2004, bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants in 2002, local police officers per 1,000 inhabitants in 2005, and hotels per 1,000 inhabitants in 2005.
Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
53
Table 17: IV Results. Income Tax Base per Capita 2010 with Civic Rights Associations (1997-
2010)
Year 2010
Panel A: First-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dependent Var. 0.55 (0.61)
N. Mergers Law 1845 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036)
F-statistic 25.9 25.2 26.9 22.9 23 22.6 17.7
Panel B: Second-Stage Results
Mean (St.Dev.) Dependent Var. 19,391.9 (3,843)
Civic rights assoc pc (97-10) 1,547.1** 1,692.4*** 1,714.3*** 1,826.7*** 1,815.9*** 1,834*** 1,671.4***
(683) (500.1) (510) (525.4) (520.5) (545.5) (550.1)
Observations 435 435 435 435 435 435 435
Centered-R2 0.26 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.48
Human Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Innovation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Roads & Public Infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Capital Yes Yes Yes
Police Forces Yes Yes
Tourism Yes
All models include a second-order polynomial function of the population measured in 2010 and 1845, municipal land area, elevation, rugged-
ness, distance to the sea, mean rainfall, mean temperature, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a municipality has more than 100,000
inhabitants, and province fixed effects. Additional controls include the percentage of citizens with secondary or college education in 2001,
patents per 1,000 inhabitants in 2010, road density in 1990, sports facilities per 1,000 inhabitants in 2010, and libraries per 1,000 inhabitants in
2010, bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants in 2002, local police officers per 1,000 inhabitants in 2010, and hotels per 1,000 inhabitants in 2010.
Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 18: Correlation between Associations, Civic Behavior, Social Interaction and Resident
Engagement
Civic Behavior Social Interaction Resident Engagement
(1) (2) (3)
Mean (St.Dev.) Dep. Var. 6.09 (0.51) 7.57 (0.64) 4.39 (0.71)
Total Associations pc 1997-2012 1.34*** 1.67*** 0.97***
(0.046) (0.054) (0.035)
R2 0.91 0.91 0.89
Civic Rights Associations pc 1997-2012 9.84*** 12.37*** 7.26***
(0.72) (0.84) (0.51)
R2 0.74 0.76 0.76
Cultural Associations pc 1997-2012 3.12*** 3.88*** 2.24***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.08)
R2 0.91 0.90 0.88
Observations 104 104 104
The dependent variable is the average value at the municipal level of the individuals’ responses to the following questions. In
column (1): “On a scale from 0 (none) to 10 (a lot), how do you value the level of civic behavior in your municipality?”. In
column (2): “Regarding the people in your neighborhood/municipality, how often do you interact with them on a scale from
0 (I do not interact with anybody) to 10 (I have relationships with many people)”. In column (3): “Regarding the following
problems: impoliteness of your neighbors, bad shape of urban amenities, noise, uncleanliness, presence of drug-users or drug-
dealers, disruptive youth, prostitutes, homeless people and beggars; how do you value your neighbors’ behavior on a scale from
0 (they don’t do anything about it) to 10 (they do a lot)?”. The results shown are the coefficients of an OLS univariate regression





IEB Working Papers  
2013 
 
2013/1, Sánchez-Vidal, M.; González-Val, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Sequential city growth in the US: does age 
matter?" 
2013/2, Hortas Rico, M.: "Sprawl, blight and the role of urban containment policies. Evidence from US cities" 
2013/3, Lampón, J.F.; Cabanelas-Lorenzo, P-; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Why firms relocate their production overseas? The 
answer lies inside: corporate, logistic and technological determinants" 
2013/4, Montolio, D.; Planells, S.: "Does tourism boost criminal activity? Evidence from a top touristic country" 
2013/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Holl, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Suburbanization and highways: when the Romans, the 
Bourbons and the first cars still shape Spanish cities" 
2013/6, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Montolio, D.: "Should large Spanish municipalities be financially compensated? Costs 
and benefits of being a capital/central municipality" 
2013/7, Escardíbul, J.O.; Mora, T.: "Teacher gender and student performance in mathematics. Evidence from 
Catalonia" 
2013/8, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Banking towards development: evidence from the Spanish banking 
expansion plan" 
2013/9, Asensio, J.; Gómez-Lobo, A.; Matas, A.: "How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption? 
Evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain" 
2013/10, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "The effects of unemployment benefits on migration in lagging regions" 
2013/11, Segarra, A.; García-Quevedo, J.; Teruel, M.: "Financial constraints and the failure of innovation projects" 
2013/12, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.: "The mathematics skills of school children: How does England compare to the high 
performing East Asian jurisdictions?" 
2013/13, González-Val, R.; Tirado-Fabregat, D.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Market potential and city growth: Spain 
1860-1960" 
2013/14, Lundqvist, H.: "Is it worth it? On the returns to holding political office" 
2013/15, Ahlfeldt, G.M.; Maennig, W.: "Homevoters vs. leasevoters: a spatial analysis of airport effects" 
2013/16, Lampón, J.F.; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Factors behind international relocation and changes in production geography 
in the European automobile components industry" 
2013/17, Guío, J.M.; Choi, A.: "Evolution of the school failure risk during the 2000 decade in Spain: analysis of Pisa 
results with a two-level logistic mode" 
2013/18, Dahlby, B.; Rodden, J.: "A political economy model of the vertical fiscal gap and vertical fiscal imbalances in 
a federation" 
2013/19, Acacia, F.; Cubel, M.: "Strategic voting and happiness" 
2013/20, Hellerstein, J.K.; Kutzbach, M.J.; Neumark, D.: "Do labor market networks have an important spatial 
dimension?" 
2013/21, Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Is money all? Financing versus knowledge and demand constraints to innovation" 
2013/22, Lin, J.: "Regional resilience" 
2013/23, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: "R&D drivers and obstacles to innovation in the 
energy industry" 
2013/24, Huisman, R.; Stradnic, V.; Westgaard, S.: "Renewable energy and electricity prices: indirect empirical 
evidence from hydro power" 
2013/25, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/26, Lambertini, L.; Mantovani, A.: "Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, 
voracity and exhaustion" 
2013/27, Feld, L.P.; Kalb, A.; Moessinger, M.D.; Osterloh, S.: "Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules and no-
bailout clauses – the Swiss experience" 
2013/28, Hilber, C.A.L.; Vermeulen, W.: "The impact of supply constraints on house prices in England" 
2013/29, Revelli, F.: "Tax limits and local democracy" 
2013/30, Wang, R.; Wang, W.: "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization" 
2013/31, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/32, Saarimaa, T.; Tukiainen, J.: "Local representation and strategic voting: evidence from electoral boundary 
reforms" 
2013/33, Agasisti, T.; Murtinu, S.: "Are we wasting public money? No! The effects of grants on Italian university 
students’ performances" 
2013/34, Flacher, D.; Harari-Kermadec, H.; Moulin, L.: "Financing higher education: a contributory scheme" 
2013/35, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: "Sending the pork home: birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities" 




IEB Working Papers  
2013/37, Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Waterson, M.: "Revenues from storage in a competitive electricity market: Empirical 





2014/1, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "When police patrols matter. The effect of police proximity on citizens’ crime 
risk perception" 
2014/2, Garcia-López, M.A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do land use policies follow road construction?" 
2014/3, Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: "Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle" 
2014/4, Cuberes, D.; González-Val, R.: "The effect of the Spanish Reconquest on Iberian Cities" 
2014/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, E.: "Tax professionals' view of the Spanish tax system: efficiency, equity 
and tax planning" 
2014/6, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Difference-form group contests" 
2014/7, Del Rey, E.; Racionero, M.: "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-pooling" 
2014/8, Torregrosa Hetland, S.: "A fiscal revolution? Progressivity in the Spanish tax system, 1960-1990" 
2014/9, Piolatto, A.: "Itemised deductions: a device to reduce tax evasion" 
2014/10, Costa, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Segarra, A.: "Energy efficiency determinants: an empirical analysis of 
Spanish innovative firms" 
2014/11, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Reviving demand-pull perspectives: the effect of demand 
uncertainty and stagnancy on R&D strategy" 
2014/12, Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Barriers to non-formal professional training in Spain in periods of economic 
growth and crisis. An analysis with special attention to the effect of the previous human capital of workers" 
2014/13, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Gender differences and stereotypes in the beauty" 
2014/14, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: "Media competition and electoral politics" 
2014/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Regulatory environment and firm performance in EU 
telecommunications services" 
2014/16, Lopez-Rodriguez, J.; Martinez, D.: "Beyond the R&D effects on innovation: the contribution of non-R&D 
activities to TFP growth in the EU" 
2014/17, González-Val, R.: "Cross-sectional growth in US cities from 1990 to 2000" 
2014/18, Vona, F.; Nicolli, F.: "Energy market liberalization and renewable energy policies in OECD countries" 
2014/19, Curto-Grau, M.: "Voters’ responsiveness to public employment policies" 
2014/20, Duro, J.A.; Teixidó-Figueras, J.; Padilla, E.: "The causal factors of international inequality in co2 emissions 
per capita: a regression-based inequality decomposition analysis" 
2014/21, Fleten, S.E.; Huisman, R.; Kilic, M.; Pennings, E.; Westgaard, S.: "Electricity futures prices: time varying 
sensitivity to fundamentals" 
2014/22, Afcha, S.; García-Quevedo, J,: "The impact of R&D subsidies on R&D employment composition" 
2014/23, Mir-Artigues, P.; del Río, P.: "Combining tariffs, investment subsidies and soft loans in a renewable electricity 
deployment policy" 
2014/24, Romero-Jordán, D.; del Río, P.; Peñasco, C.: "Household electricity demand in Spanish regions. Public policy 
implications" 
2014/25, Salinas, P.: "The effect of decentralization on educational outcomes: real autonomy matters!" 
2014/26, Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Does corruption erode trust in government? Evidence from a recent 
surge of local scandals in Spain" 
2014/27, Costas-Pérez, E.: "Political corruption and voter turnout: mobilization or disaffection?" 
2014/28, Cubel, M.; Nuevo-Chiquero, A.; Sanchez-Pages, S.; Vidal-Fernandez, M.: "Do personality traits affect 
productivity? Evidence from the LAB" 
2014/29, Teresa Costa, M.T.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Retail price effects of feed-in tariff regulation" 
2014/30, Kilic, M.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "The stabilizing effect of hydro reservoir levels on intraday power prices under 
wind forecast errors" 
2014/31, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.: "The diffusion of patented oil and gas technology with environmental 
uses: a forward patent citation analysis" 
2014/32, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: "Public-private sector wage differentials by type of contract: evidence 
from Spain" 
2014/33, Backus, P.; Esteller-Moré, A.: "Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?" 





IEB Working Papers  
2014/35, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.; Simancas Rodríguez, R.: "Two-sample two-stage least squares (TSTSLS) estimates of 
earnings mobility: how consistent are they?" 
2014/36, Mantovani, A.;  Tarola, O.; Vergari, C.: "Hedonic quality, social norms, and environmental campaigns" 
2014/37, Ferraresi, M.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Local infrastructures and externalities: Does the size matter?" 





2015/1, Foremny, D.; Freier, R.; Moessinger, M-D.; Yeter, M.: "Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative 
and the executive" 
2015/2, Colombo, L.; Galmarini, U.: "Optimality and distortionary lobbying: regulating tobacco consumption" 
2015/3, Pellegrino, G.: "Barriers to innovation: Can firm age help lower them?" 
2015/4, Hémet, C.: "Diversity and employment prospects: neighbors matter!" 
2015/5, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions" 
2015/6, Choi, A.; Jerrim, J.: "The use (and misuse) of Pisa in guiding policy reform: the case of Spain" 
2015/7, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between sub-
central administrations" 
2015/8, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Analysing the sensitivity of electricity system operational costs to 
deviations in supply and demand" 
2015/9, Salvadori, L.: "Does tax enforcement counteract the negative effects of terrorism? A case study of the Basque 
Country" 
2015/10, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "How time shapes crime: the temporal impacts of football matches on crime" 
2015/11, Piolatto, A.: "Online booking and information: competition and welfare consequences of review aggregators" 
2015/12, Boffa, F.; Pingali, V.; Sala, F.: "Strategic investment in merchant transmission: the impact of capacity 
utilization rules" 
2015/13, Slemrod, J.: "Tax administration and tax systems" 
2015/14, Arqué-Castells, P.; Cartaxo, R.M.; García-Quevedo, J.; Mira Godinho, M.: "How inventor royalty shares 
affect patenting and income in Portugal and Spain" 
2015/15, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "Measuring the negative externalities of a private leisure activity: hooligans 
and pickpockets around the stadium" 
2015/16, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Costa-Campi, M.T.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Unexpected consequences of liberalisation: 
metering, losses, load profiles and cost settlement in Spain’s electricity system" 
2015/17, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Impacts of intermittent renewable generation on electricity system 
costs" 
2015/18, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Paniagua, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Are energy market integrations a green light for FDI?" 
2015/19, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sánchez-Vidal, M.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Big plant closures and agglomeration 
economies" 
2015/20, Garcia-López, M.A.; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "How does transportation shape intrametropolitan 
growth? An answer from the regional express rail" 
2015/21, Esteller-Moré, A.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Fiscal equalization under political pressures" 
2015/22, Escardíbul, J.O.; Afcha, S.: "Determinants of doctorate holders’ job satisfaction. An analysis by employment 
sector and type of satisfaction in Spain" 
2015/23, Aidt, T.; Asatryan, Z.; Badalyan, L.; Heinemann, F.: "Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?" 
2015/24, Albæk, K.: "A test of the ‘lose it or use it’ hypothesis in labour markets around the world" 
2015/25, Angelucci, C.; Russo, A.: "Petty corruption and citizen feedback" 
2015/26, Moriconi, S.; Picard, P.M.; Zanaj, S.: "Commodity taxation and regulatory competition" 
2015/27, Brekke, K.R.; Garcia Pires, A.J.; Schindler, D.; Schjelderup, G.: "Capital taxation and imperfect 
competition: ACE vs. CBIT" 
2015/28, Redonda, A.: "Market structure, the functional form of demand and the sensitivity of the vertical reaction 
function" 
2015/29, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: "An analysis of wage differentials between full-and part-time workers in 
Spain" 
2015/30, Garcia-López, M.A.; Pasidis, I.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Express delivery to the suburbs the effects of 
transportation in Europe’s heterogeneous cities" 





IEB Working Papers  
2015/32, Choi, H.; Choi, A.: "When one door closes: the impact of the hagwon curfew on the consumption of private 
tutoring in the republic of Korea" 
2015/33, Escardíbul, J.O.; Helmy, N.: "Decentralisation and school autonomy impact on the quality of education: the 
case of two MENA countries" 
2015/34, González-Val, R.; Marcén, M.: "Divorce and the business cycle: a cross-country analysis" 
2015/35, Calero, J.; Choi, A.: "The distribution of skills among the European adult population and unemployment: a 
comparative approach" 
2015/36, Mediavilla, M.; Zancajo, A.: "Is there real freedom of school choice? An analysis from Chile" 
2015/37, Daniele, G.: "Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability" 
2015/38, González-Val, R.; Marcén, M.: "Regional unemployment, marriage, and divorce" 
2015/39, Foremny, D.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "‘Hold that ghost’: using notches to identify manipulation of 
population-based grants" 
2015/40, Mancebón, M.J.; Ximénez-de-Embún, D.P.; Mediavilla, M.; Gómez-Sancho, J.M.: "Does educational 
management model matter? New evidence for Spain by a quasiexperimental approach" 
2015/41, Daniele, G.; Geys, B.: "Exposing politicians’ ties to criminal organizations: the effects of local government 
dissolutions on electoral outcomes in Southern Italian municipalities" 





2016/1, Galletta, S.: "Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment in 
Italy" 
2016/2, Flatley, L.; Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Trujillo-Baute, E.; Waterson, M.: "Analysing the potential economic 
value of energy storage" 
2016/3, Calero, J.; Murillo Huertas, I.P.; Raymond Bara, J.L.: "Education, age and skills: an analysis using the 
PIAAC survey" 
2016/4, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Daví-Arderius, D.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "The economic impact of electricity losses" 
2016/5, Falck, O.; Heimisch, A.; Wiederhold, S.: "Returns to ICT skills" 
2016/6, Halmenschlager, C.; Mantovani, A.: "On the private and social desirability of mixed bundling in 
complementary markets with cost savings" 
2016/7, Choi, A.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: "Double toil and trouble: grade retention and academic 
performance" 
2016/8, González-Val, R.: "Historical urban growth in Europe (1300–1800)" 
2016/9, Guio, J.; Choi, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Labor markets, academic performance and the risk of school dropout: 
evidence for Spain" 
2016/10, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.; Tamagni, F.: "Innovation strategies and firm growth" 
2016/11, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Local labor market effects of public employment" 
2016/12, Sanchez-Vidal, M.: "Small shops for sale! The effects of big-box openings on grocery stores" 
2016/13, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Martínez-Ros, E.: "What are the determinants of investment in 
environmental R&D?" 
2016/14, García-López, M.A; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Next train to the polycentric city: The effect of 
railroads on subcenter formation" 
2016/15, Matas, A.; Raymond, J.L.; Dominguez, A.: "Changes in fuel economy: An analysis of the Spanish car market" 
2016/16, Leme, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "The effect of a specialized versus a general upper secondary school curriculum on 
students’ performance and inequality. A difference-in-differences cross country comparison" 
2016/17, Scandurra, R.I.; Calero, J.: “Modelling adult skills in OECD countries” 
2016/18, Fernández-Gutiérrez, M.; Calero, J.: “Leisure and education: insights from a time-use analysis” 
2016/19, Del Rio, P.; Mir-Artigues, P.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “Analysing the impact of renewable energy regulation on 
retail electricity prices” 
2016/20, Taltavull de la Paz, P.; Juárez, F.; Monllor, P.: “Fuel Poverty: Evidence from housing perspective” 
2016/21, Ferraresi, M.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: “Switch towards tax centralization in Italy: A wake up 
for the local political budget cycle” 
2016/22, Ferraresi, M.; Migali, G.; Nordi, F.; Rizzo, L.: “Spatial interaction in local expenditures among Italian 
municipalities: evidence from Italy 2001-2011” 




IEB Working Papers  
2016/24, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Banking the unbanked: Evidence from the Spanish banking 
expansion plan“ 
2016/25 Choi, Á.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: “The evolution of educational inequalities in Spain: Dynamic 
evidence from repeated cross-sections” 
2016/26, Brutti, Z.: “Cities drifting apart: Heterogeneous outcomes of decentralizing public education” 
2016/27, Backus, P.; Cubel, M.; Guid, M.; Sánchez-Pages, S.; Lopez Manas, E.: “Gender, competition and 
performance: evidence from real tournaments” 
2016/28, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: “Innovation strategies of energy firms” 
2016/29, Daniele, G.; Dipoppa, G.: “Mafia, elections and violence against politicians” 





2017/1, González Pampillón, N.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Can urban renewal policies reverse 
neighborhood ethnic dynamics?” 
2017/2, Gómez San Román, T.: “Integration of DERs on power systems: challenges and opportunities” 
2017/3, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.: “Innovation persistence and employment dynamics” 
2017/4, Curto‐Grau, M.; Solé‐Ollé, A.; Sorribas‐Navarro, P.: “Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?” 
2017/5, Solé‐Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Housing booms and busts and local fiscal policy” 
2017/6, Esteller, A.; Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: “Taxing high-income earners: Tax avoidance and mobility” 
2017/7, Combes, P.P.; Duranton, G.; Gobillon, L.: “The production function for housing: Evidence from France” 
2017/8, Nepal, R.; Cram, L.; Jamasb, T.; Sen, A.: “Small systems, big targets: power sector reforms and renewable 
energy development in small electricity systems” 
2017/9, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: “Distributive politics inside the city? The political economy of Spain’s plan E” 
2017/10, Neisser, C.: “The elasticity of taxable income: A meta-regression analysis” 
2017/11, Baker, E.; Bosetti, V.; Salo, A.: “Finding common ground when experts disagree: robust portfolio decision 
analysis” 
2017/12, Murillo, I.P; Raymond, J.L; Calero, J.: “Efficiency in the transformation of schooling into competences:  
A cross-country analysis using PIAAC data” 
2017/13, Ferrer-Esteban, G.; Mediavilla, M.: “The more educated, the more engaged? An analysis of social capital and 
education” 
2017/14, Sanchis-Guarner, R.: “Decomposing the impact of immigration on house prices” 
2017/15, Schwab, T.; Todtenhaupt, M.: “Spillover from the haven: Cross-border externalities of patent box regimes 
within multinational firms” 
2017/16, Chacón, M.; Jensen, J.: “The institutional determinants of Southern secession” 
2017/17, Gancia, G.; Ponzetto, G.A.M.; Ventura, J.: “Globalization and political structure” 
2017/18, González-Val, R.: “City size distribution and space” 
2017/19, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Pellegrino, G.: “What firms don’t know can hurt them: Overcoming a 
lack of information on technology” 
2017/20, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.: “Why do manufacturing industries invest in energy R&D?” 





2018/1, Boadway, R.; Pestieau, P.: “The tenuous case for an annual wealth tax” 
2018/2, Garcia-López, M.À.: “All roads lead to Rome ... and to sprawl? Evidence from European cities” 
2018/3, Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.; Geys, B.: “Abandon ship? Party brands and politicians’ responses to a political 
scandal” 
2018/4, Cavalcanti, F.; Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.: “Popularity shocks and political selection” 
2018/5, Naval, J.; Silva, J. I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Employment effects of on-the-job human capital acquisition” 
2018/6, Agrawal, D. R.; Foremny, D.: “Relocation of the rich: migration in response to top tax rate changes from 
spanish reforms” 
2018/7, García-Quevedo, J.; Kesidou, E.; Martínez-Ros, E.: “Inter-industry differences in organisational eco-
innovation: a panel data study” 




IEB Working Papers  
2018/9, Curci, F.; Masera, F.: “Flight from urban blight: lead poisoning, crime and suburbanization” 
2018/10, Grossi, L.; Nan, F.: “The influence of renewables on electricity price forecasting: a robust approach” 
2018/11, Fleckinger, P.; Glachant, M.; Tamokoué Kamga, P.-H.: “Energy performance certificates and investments in 
building energy efficiency: a theoretical analysis” 
2018/12, van den Bergh, J. C.J.M.; Angelsen, A.; Baranzini, A.; Botzen, W.J. W.; Carattini, S.; Drews, S.; Dunlop, 
T.; Galbraith, E.; Gsottbauer, E.; Howarth, R. B.; Padilla, E.; Roca, J.; Schmidt, R.: “Parallel tracks towards a 
global treaty on carbon pricing” 
2018/13, Ayllón, S.; Nollenberger, N.: “The unequal opportunity for skills acquisition during the Great Recession in 
Europe” 
2018/14, Firmino, J.: “Class composition effects and school welfare: evidence from Portugal using panel data” 
2018/15, Durán-Cabré, J. M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Mas-Montserrat, M.; Salvadori, L.: “La brecha fiscal: estudio y 
aplicación a los impuestos sobre la riqueza” 
 
 
 
Fiscal Federalism 
 
ieb@ub.edu 
www.ieb.edu 
